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my paper deals with Searle’s account of the normative dimension involved in the 
performance of speech acts. I will first critically assess the rule-based speech act theory 
behind Searle’s characterization of the normativity of language – arguing that this 
approach cannot explain what makes a certain illocutionary act the specific type of 
illocutionary act it is, both in literal and non-literal or indirect cases. as an alternative, 
i will endorse the inferentialist model of linguistic communication proposed by Bach 
and Harnish. Besides a benefit on the side of speech act theory, the inferentialist model 
– along with some suggestions offered by Grice’s later reflections about rationality – can 
adequately account for the normative dimension arising from language. in particular, 
it enables to do so by emphasizing an aspect pointed out by Searle himself: the social 
character of the communication situation. i will claim that the presumption about the 
interlocutor’s rationality could be regarded as the basic form of normativity deriving 
from the social character of the communication situation. 
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in this paper i address a crucial thesis maintained in Searle’s making the 
Social World, namely that “language is the basic form of public deontology” 
(Searle 2010, 82). my aim is to criticize the rule-based speech act theory 
underlying Searle’s account of the normativity of language, arguing in favor 
of an alternative way of accounting for the normative dimension associated 
with the performance of speech acts. in order to deal with the criticism 
it is worth considering in the first place the way Searle characterizes the 
deontology related to the performance of speech acts.
Searle’s rule-based approach to speech acts survives substantially unaltered 
since its early formulation in Speech acts (1969), inasmuch as Searle avows 
that “it is tempting, and indeed true, to say that the constitutive rules 
[whose form is ‘X counts as y in c’] of the institutions of statement making 
and promising make every statement into a commitment to truth and 
every promise into an obligation to do something’’ (Searle 2010, 81). the 
hypothesis central to Speech acts consists in regarding “the semantic 
structure of a language as a conventional realization of a series of sets 
of underlying constitutive rules”, with speech acts defined as “acts 
characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with 
these sets of constitutive rules” (Searle 1969, 37). in making the Social World 
Searle is concerned with the nature of the commitment engendered by the 
performance of a speech act and the dependence of the commitment on the 
compliance of that performance with the constitutive rules. 
according to Searle, it is not possible to perform a speech act in accordance 
to conventional procedures, without thereby publicly committing oneself 
to the conditions of satisfaction proper of the speech act performed. the 
undertaking of social commitment is internal to the performance of any 
possible speech act. Searle states that the necessity of social commitments 
derives from:
(i) the social character of the communication situation,
(ii) the conventional character of the devices used,
(iii) the intentionality of speaker meaning (Searle 2010, 80). 
aspects ii. and iii. play a strong role in Searle’s characterization of the 
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commitment produced by the performance of a speech act. With respect 
to iii., in the standard speech act situation the commitment flows 
from the primary-meaning intention (i.e., the intentional imposition of 
conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction) as well as from the 
communicative intention (i.e., the intention that the hearer should recognize 
the representing intention) (Searle 1986, 2010). With respect to ii., the 
commitment flows from the conventional character of the procedures 
allowing to communicate the conditions of satisfaction, namely the 
accordance of the speech act performed with some relevant semantic rules. 
as to i., it is intended by Searle as concerning the fact that the performance 
of a speech act is “above all a public performance” (Searle 2010, 83).
according to many scholars, Searle’s approach presents at least one 
weakness. Bach and harnish, in particular, maintain that a rule-based 
conventionalist approach cannot properly account for non-literal 
and indirect performances of illocutionary acts. more generally, the 
performance of the speech act in compliance with conventional rules is 
not sufficient to perform the act as an act of a certain illocutionary type: 
“meaning never exhausts illocutionary force” (Bach & harnish 1979, 132)1. 
For example, the utterance of the sentence “the door is open” may well 
be an assertion, an order, a threat, or a piece of advice, and the linguistic 
meaning of the sentence alone cannot determine it. 
With regard to Searle’s account, Searle explicitly limits it to serious, literal and 
direct discourse (Searle 1969, 20, 55-56). Furthermore, Searle’s own attempt to 
explain indirect speech acts (Searle 1975), notwithstanding its appeal to rules 
and conventions, brings into play mutually shared background information, 
the hearer’s inferential abilities, and general principles of cooperative 
conversation. Still, the strategy employed to explain indirect cases remains 
peripheral and is not complemented with the main rule-based account 
according to which literal cases are fully accounted for. 
the objection i therefore address to Searle’s rule-based account of speech acts 
is analogous to the one Searle himself (Searle 1980) made against the traditional 
semantic thesis, which states that the literal meaning of a sentence determines 
its truth conditions. Searle’s claim is that “the literal meaning of a sentence 
only determines a set of truth conditions given a set of background practices 
1  as an example, considering the words “i love you like my brother”, the hearer could 
understand the utterance in several different ways: as an assurance, an admission, an answer to a 
question, or a promise. moreover, by hearing “the sun is shining on me today” the hearer cannot 
determine whether the speaker is performing a literal or a non-literal illocutionary act.
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and assumptions”, that is to say, the interpretation of a literal sentence is made 
possible only against “a whole background of information about how nature 
works and our culture works” (Searle 1980, 226-227)2.
in the light of Searle’s considerations about literal meaning, and along 
with Bach and harnish, i claim that the kind of illocutionary act 
performed by a certain utterance cannot be determined ignoring a set of 
“background presumptions” about the communication context shared by 
the interlocutors, and that this applies even to literal and direct cases3. 
Whether the utterance of the sentence “the door is open” constitutes 
an assertion, an order, a threat, or a piece of advice obviously depends 
not only on “what is said,” but also on the context of utterance and on the 
speaker’s communicative intention.
in contrast with Searle’s approach, and endorsing Bach and harnish’s 
perspective (1979), i advocate in favor of an inferentialist model of linguistic 
communication, explaining and motivating the need for such a model. in 
the inferentialist model, the hearer’s understanding of the illocutionary act 
amounts to inferring the speaker’s attitude from “what is said”, together 
with mutual contextual beliefs, two general mutual beliefs peculiar to the 
communication situation (linguistic and communicative presumptions), and a 
set of conversational presumptions (drawn from grice’s maxims). 
Such presumptions represent the conception of the communication-
exchange as shared by the interlocutors, enabling them to engage in the 
communicative interaction, and actually determining the very possibility 
of any interaction. they have the status of defeasible mutual beliefs in 
that they are operative unless there is indication to the contrary, in which 
case the hearer is invited to seek for some alternative interpretations, 
or to suspend the presumption relevant to the incongruity in question. 
For instance, an incongruity regarding the communicative presumption 
would induce the hearer to think that no speech act is being performed 
at all, since this presumption enables the speaker not to determine what 
illocutionary act has been performed by uttering an expression, but rather 
that an illocutionary act has thereby been performed. moreover, Bach and 
2  Searle focuses on the word “cut”: in spite of its having “one and the same semantic content”, 
it “seems to make a different contribution to the truth condition of the sentence in each case” in 
which it occurs – e.g., “Bill cut the grass”, “Sally cut the cake”, “the President cut the salaries of 
the employees”, “cut the cackle!” (Searle 1980, 223, 221).
3  See (kissine 2011) for a recent criticism of Searle’s view on the determination of the illocutionary 
act. kissine also appeals to the tension between Searle’s speech act theory and his writings on the 
background of meaning. See also (recanati 2003) on this point.
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harnish contend that due to a presumption of literaliness, the hearer is guided 
to infer – as a first hypothesis – a literal interpretation of the utterance4. the 
(direct) literal act, as opposite to non-literal or indirect ones, represents the 
occurrence of the most straightforward relation between what is said and 
what is done (respectively, locutionary and illocutionary acts). 
central to the inferentialist account is the fact that communication consists 
in the speaker’s expression of an attitude by means of reflexive-intending 
(i.e., an intention intended to be recognized as so intended) “that the hearer 
take the [speaker]’s utterance as reason to think [she] has that attitude” 
(Bach and harnish 1979, 39, emphasis mine). 
the account of linguistic communication provided by the inferentialist 
model has the advantage of including the explication of non-literal and 
indirect speech acts within the same inferential schema involved in the 
literal cases. indeed, the recognition of direct and literal illocutionary 
acts rests on an inferential process which is homogeneous for all kinds of 
strategies: direct literal, literally-based indirect, direct non-literal and 
non-literally-based indirect5. moreover, the inferentialist model allows us 
to focus on the first of the aspects pinpointed by Searle, as the basis from 
which it is possible to account for the normativity of language. 
In doing so, I distance myself from Bach and Harnish, who define a “moral 
question” whether illocutionary acts create a deontology, stating that “at 
best they create mutual beliefs between speaker and hearer about rights 
and obligations” (Bach & harnish 1979, 124)6. as Searle, i do regard the 
deontology engendered by language as internal to the performance of speech 
acts. nevertheless, i do not consider the deontology as consequential to the 
compliance of that performance to a system of semantic rules governing 
the conventional devices employed. instead, i put the focus on the “social 
character of the communication situation”, from the standpoint of the 
analysis provided by Bach and harnish, and of some suggestions occurring 
in Grice’s later reflections about reason, rationality and value (Grice 1991, 
2001). With regard to Grice’s reflections, I sketch out below his main view.
4 it has to be noticed that the hypothesis of a presumption of literaliness is too strong, and 
that maybe the appeal to such presumption may be avoided. 
5 characterizing the understanding of speech acts as an inferential process amounts to 
considering such process as abductive (non-monotonic) reasoning, along with the analysis 
provided by ai (see hobbs 2004). 
6 See also (harnish 2005), which faces the issue of normativity, but envisions a solution 
different from the (inferentialist) one that i am proposing here.
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In the John Locke Lectures, held in 1979, Grice undertakes a clarification of 
the notions of reason and rationality by means of an analysis of the concept 
of reasoning. as a result, he upholds that the idea  
of good reasoning is prior to, and in fact shapes the concept of reasoning 
itself. reasoning amounts to a value-paradigmatic concept, and rationality/
reason turns out to be an evaluative concept as well (grice 2001, 35-36). 
Furthermore, in the carus lectures (1983) he describes the attribute of 
rationality as consisting in “a concern on the part of the creature which has 
it […] that the attitudes, positions, and acceptances which he (voluntarily) 
takes up should have attached to them certificates of value of some 
appropriate kind,” i.e., that these attitudes should be “well grounded, based 
on reasons, or validated” (grice 1991, 82). taking into consideration grice’s 
suggestions, and rephrasing an idea originally expressed by Jaegwon kim 
(kim 1988), we could say that the terms within the scope of rationality are 
normative, since rationality itself is essentially normative.  
i claim that the presumption about the interlocutor’s rationality could be regarded 
as the basic form of normativity deriving from the social character of the 
communication situation. this key presumption, along with general mutual 
beliefs of the kind specified by Bach and Harnish, constitutes the precondition 
for any communicative interaction. the reasons with which – according to the 
inferentialist model – a speaker provides a hearer by expressing a definite 
attitude (i.e., by performing an illocutionary act intending it as an act of a 
certain kind) are proper of a rational creature7. 
considering a creature as rational amounts to attributing a value to her. 
considering her in such a way implies to have some expectations about her 
behaviour, which in turn imposes some constraints on one’s own behaviour. 
to this end, i claim that these expectations and the corresponding 
constraints can be regarded as constituting an ultra-minimalist notion 
of normativity, starting from which it might be possible to account for 
the more complex arrangements of deontic powers (e.g., commitments, 
obligations, rights, licenses) involved in the performance of any speech act. 
In the light of Grice’s reflections, we could say that the normative dimension 
7 making explicit the presumption about the interlocutor’s rationality – which underlies 
Bach and harnish’s inferential schema, but is not fully articulated by the authors – would make 
it possible not to posit the presumption of literaliness, and to fully account for the notion of 
conversational appropriateness. Bach and Harnish seem in fact unable to define this notion 
without circularity, inasmuch as they define it by referring to the conversational presumptions 
borrowed from grice’s maxims (Bach and harnish 1979, 65). 
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engendered by the performance of speech acts – which i have here traced 
back, as its basic form, to the presumption about the interlocutor’s 
rationality – amounts to the evaluative dimension corresponding to such 
presumption. 
investigating on this possibility would represent a promising direction for 
further research on the topic. however, this goes beyond the scope of this 
proposal, which simply has the character of a quessertion8.
8 Richard Grandy once defined this way the character of of some of Grice’s remarks. This kind 
of speech act should be read as “it is perhaps possible that someone might assert that […]” (grice 
1989, 297).
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